California\u27s New General Corporation Law: Close And Closely-Held Corporations by Berger, Don
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 4
7-1-1976
California's New General Corporation Law: Close
And Closely-Held Corporations
Don Berger
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Don Berger, California's New General Corporation Law: Close And Closely-Held Corporations, 7 Pac. L. J. (1976).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol7/iss2/4
California's New General Corporation Law:
Close And Closely-Held Corporations
DON BERGER*
The evolution of American corporation law in the twentieth century
has fragmented a once monolithic body of law. Commencing with the
publication of Berle and Means' historic work,' the recognition of the
separation of ownership from control in the publicly-held corporation
has led to a now separate and incredibly complex securities regulation
system designed to protect investors in publicly-traded securities. At
the same time, a movement to decrease the regulatory and substantive
impact of general corporation law on small, owner-operated corpora-
tions has found growing judicial and legislative support, resulting in the
creation of an increasingly independent body of "close corporation
law.' 2
Coming at a time when the very right to incorporate is under ques-
tion,' this latter development may seem surprising. Assuming that one
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1. A. BERrLE Am G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPOITION AND PmrvATE PRoPERTY
(1932). A revised edition of this work was published in 1968.
2. The leading treatise is F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CoxRoRATioNs, 2 vols. (2d ed. 1971)(hereinafter cited as O'NEAL). A useful one-volume work with emphasis on tax plan-
ning is W. PAINTER, Cou'oRATE Am TAX ASPECrs OF CLosELY HELD CoRPORAToNs(1971) (hereinafter cited as PANTER). Law review symposia include Symposium, The
Close Corporation, 18 L. & CoNT. PROB. 433-583 (1953); Symposium, Close Corpora-
tions, 1969 U. ILL. LF. 1-73 (part I), 139-223 (part II). For references to law review
articles on particular aspects of close corporation law, see the extensive footnote cita-
tions in O'NEAL.
3. See, e.g., Comment, Public Policy and the "Right" to Incorporate, 16 B.C. INn.
& COMM. L. REv. 817 (1975).
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of the basic purposes of the corporate form of conducting business
originally was to attract "outside" capital for a venture which the main
proponent was unable to finance himself,4 and that the conferral of
limited liability was the price paid by society to attract such investment,
it is indeed questionable whether the one-person, the family-owned, or
the owner-operated enterprise should be allowed to incorporate. What
benefit is bestowed upon society in return by an enterprise which
undoubtedly would have been created even in the absence of limited
liability? This question becomes even more pertinent now that the
contemporary "close corporation" desires corporate limited liability as
well as the operational flexibility, and often the income tax treatment, of
the partnership form.
Despite these questions, the "incorporated partnership," as closely-
held corporations are sometimes called, seems here to stay. With the
enactment of A.B. 376,5 the California Legislature has joined the
growing number of states recognizing by statute the "close corporation"
as a special type of business form.8 Effective January 1, 1977, the new
law creates opportunities as well as pitfalls and dangers for both the
business community and its legal advisors.
The opportunities lie in the possibility of organizing a close corpora-
tion so as to minimize, and in some areas eliminate, the cumbersome
rigidity and formalism of the traditional corporate hierarchical decision-
making process. Proper use within statutory and judicial guidelines of
a shareholder management agreement can result in a custom-made
corporate structure which meets the needs of the particular business
enterprise.7  Pitfalls and dangers, however, abound. It is to be expect-
ed that California courts will follow the judicial pattern in other states
which insists, sometimes with unjustifiable harshness, that the statutory
criteria designed for close corporations be observed punctiliously." That
insistence imposes upon lawyers the obligation to acquire expertise in
4. The origin of the common law of corporations remains somewhat unclear.
See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISToRY oiF AMERIcAN LAw 166-78, 446-59 (1973); Williston, A
History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HAv. L. Rnv. 105 (1888).
5. CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 682 (effective January 1, 1977) [hereinafter all citations
and references to the New General Corporation Law, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 682,
will be cited as or referred to as New CAL. CoRP. CODE or New Code; hereinafter all
citations and references to the General Corporation Law enacted in 1947, CAL. STATS.
1974, c. 1038 (effective until January 1, 1977) will be cited as or referred to as CAL.
CORP. CODE or Old Code]. See generally REviEw OF SELreF=D 1975 CALIFoRNIu LEGIs-
LATIo N, this volume at 258 (General Corporation Law).
6. For a description of various state statutes pertaining to close corporations, see
1 'NEAL, supra note 2, §§1.14-1.14(c).
7. See text accompanying notes 79-113 infra.
8. Thus, failure to insert a particular statutorily-permissible provision in the ar-
ticles of incorporation and inserting it in the corporate bylaws may lead a court to inval-
idate the provision. See 1 'NEAL, supra note 2, §1.14(c).
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drafting close corporation documents. It also imposes upon the partici-
pants in a close corporation the obligation to operate the enterprise in
conformance with the structure they have designed for themselves.
Close corporation status in California is elective, which raises another
problem. If a small enterprise does not elect to become a "close
corporation," is it automatically subject to all provisions applicable to
publicly-held corporations? Or can such a "closely-held," but not
statutory "close" corporation, still avail itself of some of the judicially
recognized devices for small corporations? In attempting to answer
these questions in relation to the various topics discussed in this article,
the reader should carefully differentiate hereafter between the use of the
terms "close!' corporation, referring to the statutory close corporation,
and "closely-held" corporation, referring to a corporation which has the
factual characteristics of the close corporation but which has not made
or is not eligibile to make the necessary statutory election.
ELIGIBILITY FOR ELECTION AND TERMINATION OF
CLOSE CORPORATION STATUS
A. Eligibility for Close Corporation Status
Pursuant to the New Corporations Code, a California corporation
having no more than ten record holders of all classes of its issued shares
is eligible to elect close corporation status. For the purpose of deter-
mining the number of shareholders of a corporation, a husband and wife
are counted as one shareholder regardless of how the shares are held by
either or both spouses.10 Similarly, a trust holding shares is counted as
one shareholder regardless of the number of trustees or beneficiaries.'1
A partnership, corporation, or business association holding shares is also
counted as one. 2 However, if a trust, partnership, corporation, or
business association is formed for the primary purpose of acquiring or
voting the shares, the number of beneficial interests in that trust or
9. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158(a). The original proposal developed by the Com-
mittee on Corporations of the State Bar of California and the Assembly Select Commit-
tee on the Revision of the Corporations Code specified that a corporation having no
more than 35 shareholders could elect close corporation status. STATE BAR OF CAJnoFR-
NIA, COMMrTIEE ON CORPORATIONS, ExPosuR DRAFT: GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
§159(a) (1974) (hereinafter cited as ExposuRa DRAFT No. 1). It was retained in the
ExposuRE DRAFT No. 2: GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §159(a) (1974) (hereinafter
cited as ExPosuRE DRAFT No. 2) and in the early version of A.B. 376. The number
of permitted shareholders was reduced to 20 in the May 1, 1975 amendment to-A.B.
376 (§158(a)), tnd was further reduced to ten in the August 5, 1975 amendment to
A.B. 376 (§158(a)), thus indicating a strong legislative intent to limit close corporation
benefits to truly small enterprises.
10. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158(d).
11. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158(d).
12. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158(d).
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entity is counted toward close corporation status eligibility.'8 Hence,
the holding company device is only of limited utility in the close
corporation setting.
B. Election of Close Corporation Status
A newly organized California corporation electing to be a close
corporation may accomplish that objective by including appropriate
provisions in its articles of incorporation. First, the articles of incorpo-
ration must contain the statement "This corporation is a close corpora-
tion. ' 14 Second, the name selected for a close corporation must contain
the word "corporation," "incorporated," or "limited," or an abbreviation
of one of these terms.' 5 These requirements serve to alert parties
dealing with the close corporation of the obligation to inquire into the
existence and scope of a shareholder voting or management agreement.
Third, the articles of incorporation must contain a provision stating that
all of the corporation's shares shall be held of record by not more than a
specified number of persons, not exceeding ten. 6 Barring the existence
of other factors, it would normally be advantageous to limit the number
of shareholders to ten even though the actual number of original share-
holders is less, thus obviating the necessity of future amendments to the
articles of incorporation if additional shareholders are added.1 7
A California corporation already in existence may elect close corpora-
tion status by adding the required statements noted above to its articles
of incorporation by amendment.' If amendment occurs after the issu-
ance of shares, the affirmative vote of all shares of all classes, regardless
of limitations or restrictions on voting rights, is required.' 9
Finally, the share certificate of a close corporation, in addition to all
other requirements, must contain on its face the following legend:
This corporation is a close corporation. The number of holders of
record of its shares of all classes cannot exceed - [a number not
in excess of 10]. Any attempted voluntary inter vivos transfer
which would violate this requirement is void. Refer to the articles,
13. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §158(d). The legislative intent to limit the statutory
benefits of close corporation status to truly small corporations, already noted in note 9
supra, is further reflected in this section, which prevents utilization of other devices such
as trusts or the formation of intermediate "shell" entities to circumvent the numerical
restriction of section 158(a).
14. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §158(a).
15. New CAL. Corn'. CODE §202(a).
16. New CAL. CoP. CODE §158(a).
17. See the suggested forms in the Appendix infra.
18. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158(b).
19. New CAL. CoRn. CODE §158(b).
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bylaws and any agreement on file with the secretary of the corpora-
tion for further restrictions.20
The draftsman of a close corporation must be careful to adhere to the
statutory requirements enumerated above. As noted in the introduc-
tion, the courts traditionally have been very insistent that applicable
statutory criteria be observed. In addition, the New Corporations Code
is very specific as to the necessary elements. Therefore, it would seem
that a corporation which does not strictly conform to these requirements
will not be treated as a close corporation, even though it desires to be
accorded such treatment.
C. Termination of Close Corporation Status
A statutory close corporation may elect to terminate that status by
deleting from its articles of incorporation the statements required to
become a close corporation.2' If an amendment deleting these pro-
visions occurs after the issuance of shares, an affirmative vote of at
least two-thirds of each class of the outstanding shares is required.22
Involuntary loss of close corporation status may also occur. For
example, failure to place the previously mentioned legend on the close
corporation's share certificate, followed by a voluntary inter vivos trans-
fer of shares which results in the corporation having more than the
number of shareholders permitted in its articles, will cause a forfeiture
of close corporation status.2 3 Similarly, if the number of shareholders
authorized in the articles of incorporation is exceeded as a result of a
transfer of shares by will or pursuant to the laws of descent and
distribution, loss of close corporation status occurs.24  The lawyer or-
ganizing a close corporation therefore must consider the utilization of
protective devices such as authorizing the corporation to have more than
the original number of shareholders if less than ten, the inclusion of
appropriate transfer restrictions, or even drafting appropriate will provi-
sions for the shareholders.25
20. New CAL. CoRn. CODE §418(c). Although not a prerequisite to achieving
close corporation status, compliance with this section may affect the corporation's ability
to maintain its close corporation status once acquired, and should therefore be included
in the factors considered during the organization procedure.
21. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158(c).
22. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158(c). However, the articles of incorporation may
require a lesser vote for such an amendment, but not less than a majority of the out-
standing shares; or they may deny a vote to any class, or both. New CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 158 (c).
23. New CAL. COin'. CODE §§158(e), 418(c)-(d).
24. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158(e).
25. See text accompanying notes 130-146 infra.
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A close corporation having a partnership, another corporation, or a
business association as a shareholder will lose its close corporation status
if, as the result of the dissolution of such an entity and concomitant
distribution of its assets, the close corporation's number of shareholders
exceeds the permissible number specified in its articles.2 The same
result obtains where the termination of a trust holding close corporation
shares increases the close corporation's shareholders beyond the permit-
ted number.2 7  Any increase in the number of a close corporation's
shareholders beyond its permitted maximum caused by operation of law
also results in revocation of close corporation status.28  Thus, if a close
corporation has the maximum number of shareholders which includes a
husband and wife counted as one, the dissolution of their marriage will
result in a loss of close corporation status if both former spouses remain
shareholders.
CONTROL DEVICES IN CLOSE AND CLOSELY-HELD CORuPORATIONS
Although discussed more extensively by the treatise writers,29 the
special needs of the close corporation have been succinctly identified by
the Assembly Select Committee on the Revision of the Corporations
Code (hereafter referred to as the Assembly Select Committee) in its
report to the legislature:
Typically, a close corporation is a corporation with relatively few
shareholders who wish to treat the corporation as if it were a part-
nership or who wish to structure control of the corporation so as
to allocate management responsibilities in a way that. . would
be appropriate only between partners. For instance, typical char-
acteristics of a close corporation include an emphasis on simplified
and informal procedures, general participation by most or all share-
holders in decision-making (which may even extend to the day-to-
day operation of the business) and restrictions upon share transfer
to limit shifts in shareholdings.
Under prior law the operation of a close corporation . . . [was]
unnecessarily hindered by the failure of corporation statutes to
recognize the unique attributes of these corporations. For exam-
ple, shareholders of a closely held corporation often disregard the
legal requirements and formalities for doing business in corporate
form altogether and neglect to hold shareholders' and directors'
meetings. Such practices may result in a court disregarding the
separate personality of the corporation. The practical consequence
of this potential loss of corporate status is a tendency to fabricate
26. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §158(e).
27. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158(e).
28. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158(e).
29. See, e.g., 1 ONEAL, supra note 2, Ch. I; PAwNmR, supra note 2, Ch. I11.
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the necessary documentation to preserve the image of compliance
with corporate formalities.
The intent of the close corporation provisions in the new law is
to statutorily recognize the unique characteristics of such corporate
entities and permit tailoring of the traditional corporate form to the
needs of these closely held enterprises.A0
As previously mentioned, the ability to custom-design corporate
structures places the California lawyer in a position requiring expertise
and resourcefulness. The remainder of this article will attempt to
describe and analyze various devices which may prove helpful in struc-
turing flexibile close and closely-held corporations under the provisions
of the New California Corporations Code.
A. Less Formalism in the Traditional Structure
Every closely-held corporation may not wish to abolish the traditional
corporate model in which decision-making is entrusted to the board of
directors. For example, a corporation having ten or fewer shareholders
may find it less cumbersome to operate with a board of directors than to
turn decision-making over to the shareholders under a shareholder
management agreement, especially if only some of the shareholders are
actively engaged in the corporate enterprise. For this enterprise, re-
gardless of whether it elects to become a statutory close corporation, the
continued requirement that "the business and affairs of the corporation
shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised by or
under the direction of the board" 1 may be appropriate and desirable,
even though the necessity of holding formal board meetings may occa-
sionally limit the corporation's ability to reach a decision quickly. How-
ever, two devices described in the New California Corporations Code
provide valuable flexibility in regard to the holding of board meetings.
One provision allows corporate action requiring board approval to be
taken without a board meeting if unanimous written consent for a
particular action is obtained from all members of the board.3 2  Unlike
the Old Code section,33 the new section does not require authority for
the utilization of this device to be included in the articles of incorpora-
tion or bylaws; it exists unless expressly denied in the articles or by-
laws.s4
30. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF
THE CORPORATIONS CODE, REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMIT'EE ON THE RE-
VISION OF TIE CORPORATIONS CODE 22-23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ASSEMBLY RE-
PORT].
31. New CAL. CORP. CODE §300(a).
32. New CAL. CORP. CODE §307(f).
33. CAL. CORP. CODE §814.5.
34. Inclusion of such authority in the articles and/or bylaws may nevertheless be
advisable, if for no other reason than to remind corporate management of its existence.
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Taking corporate action prior to obtaining the required written con-
sents, of course, can be risky since all of the directors may not ultimately
consent. To overcome this risk, reliance might instead be placed on a
newly enacted code provision obviating the necessity of a board meeting
which brings the directors physically together in one place. Section
307(h) of the New Code allows board members to participate in a
"formal" board meeting "through use of conference telephone or
*similar communications equipment, so long as all members participating
in such meeting can hear one another. ' 35  Designed to assure group
discussion, this statutory specification seemingly precludes the device of
obtaining the informal consent of individual directors through a series of
bilateral contacts. Although some early California cases30 and cases
from other jurisdictions37 have validated corporate action taken on the
basis of informal consent by a majority of the board of directors of a
closely-held corporation, it is questionable whether these decisions will
still be considered authoritative in California as the new legislative
authorization of two specific devices to overcome the requirement of a
formal board meeting probably can be considered to have preempted
the subject matter.38
B. Control of Shareholder Voting
Should the only concern among the participants in a closely-held
enterprise be control of the way in which shareholders vote their shares
on matters within the traditional ambit of shareholder action, several
devices are available to achieve that goal. For example, execution of
irrevocable proxies, creation of a voting trust, and execution of a share-
holder voting agreement may serve the needs of the particular enter-
prise. In addition, all of these devices may be used by closely-held as
well as close corporations.
1. Irrevocable Proxies
The least complex device used to control a shareholder's exercise of
his voting power is a delegation of that power through the execution of a
proxy. However, if the objective in a closely-held or close corporation is
35. New CAL. CoRp. CODE §307(h) (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., Brainard v. De La Montanya, 18 Cal. 2d 502, 116 P.2d 66 (1941);
Brown v. Crown Gold Milling Co., 150 Cal. 376, 89 P. 86 (1907); Scott v. Superior
Sunset Oil Co., 144 Cal. 140, 77 P. 817 (1904); Armstrong Manors v. Burris, 193 Cal.
App. 2d 447, 14 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1961); Countryman v. California Trona Co., 35 Cal.
App. 728, 170 P. 1069 (1917).
37. See, e.g., Sherman v. Fitch, 98 Mass. 59 (1867).
38. See Village of Brown Deer v. City of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 2d 206, 213-14, 114
N.W.2d 493, 497 (1962).
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to achieve a transfer of shareholder voting power to one or several
designated persons, usually the "management" group, the transfer must
not be one that can be easily terminated by the shareholder-transferor.
Thus, the problem of proxy revocability arises.
Under the common law view, a proxy is revocable unless it is a
"proxy coupled with an interest."39  The New California Corporations
Code basically follows this rule by providing that a proxy may expressly
state that it is irrevocable for a fixed period of time; however, irrevoca-
bility is permitted only in specifically designated situations. 40  The
statutory enumeration is in effect a list of situations which courts have
traditionally recognized as involving proxies coupled with an interest.
Thus:
1. A proxy may be expressly made irrevocable for a specified period
of time in favor of a pledgee of the shares covered by the proxy. This
proxy becomes revocable upon the termination of the specified period of
irrevocability or when the pledge is redeemed, whichever occurs first;41
2. A proxy may be expressly made irrevocable for a specified period
of time in favor of a person who has purchased, who has agreed to
purchase, or who holds an option to purchase, the shares covered by the
proxy. Such proxy becomes revocable upon the termination of the
specified period of irrevocability or when the option or agreement to
purchase is terminated, whichever occurs first;42
3. A proxy may be expressly made irrevocable for a specified period
of time in favor of a creditor of the corporation or of the shareholder,
provided credit was given in consideration for the proxy, and provided
the proxy so states. This type of proxy becomes revocable upon the
termination of the specified period of irrevocability or when the debt is
paid, whichever occurs first;43
4. A proxy may be made expressly irrevocable for a specified period
of time in favor of a person who has contracted to perform services as an
employee of the corporation, provided the employment contract ex-
pressly requires the proxy, and provided the proxy expressly states the
name of the employee, the period of employment, and that it was given
in consideration for the employment contract. This proxy becomes
revocable upon the termination of the specified period of irrevocability
39. Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897). See gen-
erally 1 O'NEAL, supra note 2, at §5.36; PAINTER, supra note 2, at 120-22.
40. New CAL. CoRp. CODE §705(a), (b), (e).
41. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §705(e)(1).
42. New CAL. CoRp. CoDE §705(e)(2).
43. New CAL. ConR. CODE §705(e)(3).
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or when the period of employment provided for in the employment
contract has terminated, whichever occurs first.44
Of these various types of proxies, only the last would normally be of
help to a closely-held or close corporation. For example, if only three
of the eight shareholders of a hypothetical corporation are actively
engaged in operating the enterprise, the voting power of any or all of the
inactive shareholders might be transferred to any or all of the active
shareholders through an irrevocable proxy, executed in conjunction with
the execution of employment contracts between the corporation and the
employee-shareholders.45
Following the enumeration of the specific situations of proxy irrevoc-
ability just discussed, Section 705(e) of the New Code also contains the
following general provision:
In addition to the foregoing clauses. . . a proxy may be made ir-
revocable . . . if it is given to secure the performance of a duty
or to protect a title, either legal or equitable until the happening
of events which, by its terms, discharges -the obligations secured by
it.46
The legislative intent behind this language, as expressed by the Assem-
bly Select Committee, is quite broad: "This provision is intended to
preserve any situation not specifically enumerated in which a proxy
could be considered as 'coupled with an interest.' -47
Depending upon the willingness of California courts to follow a
liberal rather than the more traditional and conservative interpretation
of what constitutes an "interest," closely-held and close corporations
may be able to use the proxy device for voting control. The traditional
interpretation requires that the proxy holder's interest must be "a
charge, lien or some property right in the shares themselves," or "a
security interest given to protect the proxy holder for money advanced
or obligations incurred. '48 Under this view, an interest on the part of
the proxy holder in the corporation generally, or in the voting power
represented by the shares, is not a sufficient interest to make the proxy
irrevocable.
However, some cases have taken a more liberal approach to the
44. New CAL. CORP. CODE §705(e)(4).
45. The matter of employment contracts in a closely-held enterprise is beyond the
scope of this article. However, the consensus is that these contracts offer valuable pro-
tection to shareholder-employees and should be utilized extensively. See generally 1
O'NAL, supra note 2, at §§6.01-6.14; PAINTER, supra note 2, at 14041; Wetzel, Employ-
ment Contracts and Noncompetition Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 61, 69-73 (1969).
46. New CAL. Con". CODE §705(e).
47. ASSEMBLY REPoRT, supra note 30, at 85-86.
48. 1 O'NEA, supra note 2, §5.36.
1976 / Close Corporations
matter of irrevocable proxies, either by eliminating the requirement of
the existence of an interest as described above or by expanding the
interest concept to include a proxy holder's general interest in the
corporation and its welfare.49 Of particular interest is a Washington
case in which the court held that a proxy would be recognized as
irrevocable if the proxy holder had an interest in the subject matter of
the proxy. 50 A Pennsylvania case involving a Delaware corporation is
in accord, the court stating that:
We know of no decision in Delaware. .. which holds that the in-
terest necessary to make a proxy irrevocable must be in the stock
itself rather than a general interest in the corporation or in what
the exercise of the proxy may accomplish or secure. The rule in
general is that the interest which will support an irrevocable proxy
need not be in the stock itself but any property interest in the proxy
holder for which the stock is held as security.51
Thus, if the shareholders of a California closely-held or close corpora-
tion agree, for the purpose of allowing some shareholders to control the
corporation, that the "outside" shareholders will execute irrevocable
proxies to the "managing" shareholder-employees, it could be forcefully
argued that the interest of the proxy holders in achieving the agreed
control allocation and their property interest in the corporation generally
constitutes a sufficient interest to support irrevocability. Whether Cali-
fornia courts will be willing -to apply this liberal approach to Section
705 (e) of the New Code, quoted above, remains to be seen. Until such
time, the California lawyer must recognize the limited usefulness of the
proxy device.
2. Voting Trusts
The revocability of a proxy not coupled with a sufficient interest to
make it irrevocable results from the fact that the proxy device, probably
unjustifiably,52 is regarded as a special form of agency. To achieve the
same goal of acquiring voting control in a different manner, "[aldroit
lawyers. . . have invented the ingenious device of a voting trust to give
to what is in essence a joint irrevocable proxy for a term of years the
'protective coloring' of a trust, so that the trustees may vote as owners
49. See, e.g., Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897);
Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun. 230, 36 N.Y.S. 627 (1895); but see Simpson v. Neilson, 77
Cal. App. 297, 246 P. 342 (1926).
50. State ex rel. Everett Trust & Say. Bank v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wash.
2d 844, 157 P.2d 707 (1945).
51. Deibler v. Charles H. Elliott Co., 368 Pa. 267, 276, 81 A.2d 557, 561 (1951).
52. 1 O'NEAL, supra note 2, §5.36.
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rather than as mere agents.' ' 3  The shareholders of a closely-held or
close corporation therefore may execute a voting trust agreement where-
by they turn over to the trustee their share certificates and in return
receive voting trust certificates. The shares are registered in the name
of the trustee who as legal owner has the right to exercise the voting
power of the shares. The voting trust agreement may instruct the
trustee to vote the shares in a specified manner on specific issues, and
may identify the person(s) for whom the shares must be voted in
director elections. 4
Thus, pursuant to the New Code, the five inactive shareholders of the
hypothetical corporation mentioned above may execute a voting trust
agreement naming one or all of the three active shareholder-managers as
trustees. This trust may be created for a specified period which cannot
exceed ten years. This specified period may be extended at any time
during the last two years of the current period, such extension, and each
subsequent extension, being limited to a maximum of ten years.'5 A
voting trust extension, of course, only binds those beneficiaries who
agree thereto. Consequently, unless the initial period of the trust's
validity accomplishes the needs of the particular corporation, the inabili-
ty to ensure voting control beyond the initial period limits the long-range
utility of this device.
Two other factors bear on the decision of whether to use a voting
trust for voting control purposes. Creation of a voting trust may
adversely affect the liquidity of the participants' investment since voting
trust certificates, though alienable, simply are not as marketable as share
certificates. In addition, voting trust certificates are securities and,
unless exempt, are subject to the qualification requirements of the
California Corporate Securites Law of 1968.56 Hence, if a voting trust
is not exempt, there may be additional paperwork, delay, and expense in
organizing the enterprise.
3. Sharehoker Voting Agreements5
Although the traditional allocation of decision-making power in the
53. H. BALLA1mE, BALLANTiNE ON CORPORATONS §184, at 425 (1946 rev. ed.).
54. See Dougherty v. Cross, 65 Cal. App. 2d 687, 151 P.2d 654 (1954); Israels,
The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 495 (1948); Woloszyn,
A Practical Guide To Voting Trusts, 4 U. BALT. L Rav. 245 (1975).
55. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §706(b).
56. See 2 H. BALLANT rE & G. STERLING, CALiFORNI A CORPOATION LAWS §455.04
(4th ed. 1975).
57. Considered here are agreements among shareholders regarding how to vote
their shares. For a discussion of agreements among shareholders which involve how the
corporation is to be managed, see text accompanying notes 79-114 infra.
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corporation gives primary authority to the board of directors, 58 so-called
"fundamental changes" in the corporate status require shareholder as
well as board approval. Among these are proposed dispositions of all
or substantially all of the corporate assets, 59 amendments to the articles
of incorporation,60 mergers,6 and voluntary dissolutions.62 In addition,
the shareholders, of course, elect the board of directors.' 3
Due to the limitations mentioned earlier in relation to the use of
proxies and voting trusts, shareholders may want to enter into a contrac-
tual agreement as to the way each will vote his shares. This type of
agreement does not involve the transfer of voting power, but simply
obligates each contracting shareholder to abide by the terms of the
agreement in voting his own shares. It is of course possible to provide
in the agreement that the contracting parties' shares shall not be voted in
a certain way but that a designated person, either an outsider or one of
the contracting parties, will cast the actual votes. In the latter case, a
proxy has obviously been incorporated into the voting agreement.
These voting agreements, sometimes referred to as shareholder pool-
ing agreements, have had a troublesome history in American corpora-
tion law. Early cases held such agreements invalid on either one of two
public policy grounds. One ground was that the previous contractual
commitment to vote a certain way discouraged full discussion at the
shareholders' meeting, thereby depriving other shareholders who were
not parties to the agreement of the benefit of all the shareholders voting
on the basis of independently reached judgments. 64 By the same token,
where a proxy device was also used, the courts invalidated the agreement
because the voting power of the stock was separated from the ownership
of the shares.65
As American corporations increased in size during the early part of
this century, these reasons lost their validity. Shareholder meetings
involving large numbers of shareholders rarely afford the opportunity
for meaningful discussion on the matters to be voted upon. In addition,
separation of voting power from ownership has become a necessity since
58. New CAL. CORP. CODE §300(a).
59. New CAL. CoRp. CODE §1001(a).
60. New CAL. CORP. CODE §§902(a), 903(a), (c), 904.
61. New CAL. CORP. CODB §1201(a).
62. New CAr.. CoRp. CODE §1900(a).
63. New CAL. CoRp. CODE §301(a).
64. See Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908); Haldeman v. Haldeman,
176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917). See also Comment, Corporations-Separation of
the Voting Power from Legal and Beneficial Ownership of Corporate Stock, 47 MICH.
L. REV. 547, 549 (1949).
65. See Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908); Harvey v. Linville Im-
provement Co., 118 N.C. 693, 24 S.E. 489 (1896); see also PAuNTm, supra note 2, at
109.
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proxies are needed to meet quorum requirements. As a result, judicial
hostility has abated as to voting agreements which are limited to proper
shareholder concerns. Increasingly, these agreements are upheld "if for
a reasonable business purpose, not fraudulent in character, nor oppres-
sive to minority shareholders." 6
a. Application to Close Corporations
The New California Corporations Code expressly recognizes the va-
lidity of voting agreements concluded between or among the sharehold-
ers of a close corporation. 7 The flexibility of voting agreements under
Section 706(a) of the New Code is remarkable, as they may extend to
any matter as to which shareholder decision-making is permitted. 8 An
agreement may specify how each shareholder shall vote his shares on
specific matters. It may require that each shareholder vote his shares on
certain matters as a specified majority, either of the parties or of their
shares, determines. It may provide that all parties will vote their shares
in accordance with an arbitrator's decision. It may compel the contract-
ing shareholders to transfer their shares to a third party who has
authority to vote the shares in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment.62 It also may provide that a third party will vote all the shares
owned by the contracting shareholders in accordance with the terms of
the agreement, thereby creating a proxy which is statutorily designated
as irrevocable.70
Section 706(a) also solves the problem encountered in earlier cases as
to the specific enforcement of voting agreements.71 It expressly states
that a close corporation's shareholder voting agreement "shall not be
denied specific performance by a court on the ground that the remedy at
law is adequate or on other grounds relating to the jurisdiction of a court
of equity. ' 72  In addition, a voting agreement executed under the
authority of Section 706(a) remains valid as long as the corporation
retains its close corporation status, or until the termination of the period
of validity specified in the agreement, whichever occurs first.
66. PAmNTER, supra note 2, at 109.
67. New CAL. CORP. CoDE §706(a).
68. As to an agreement affecting matters over which shareholders normally have
no d(ecision-making power, see text accompanying notes 79-104 infra.
69. "No agreement made pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be held to be invalid
or unenforceable on the ground that it is a voting trust which does not comply with
subdivision (b)." New CAL. CORP. CODE §706(c). See text accompanying notes 52-
56 supra.
70. New CAL. CORP. CODE §705(e)(5).
71. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling,
29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
72. New CAL. CoRs'. CODE §706(a).
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It is important to note that while no reference thereto is made in
Section 706(a), one judicially developed exception to the validity of
shareholder voting agreements undoubtedly remains in force in Califor-
nia. It has generally been held that a shareholder may not "sell" his
voting power;73 that is, he may not enter into an agreement to vote his
shares a certain way in return for a purely personal benefit. For
example, a shareholder's promise to vote his shares as his creditor directs
him in return for forgiveness of his debt is invalid.
74
b. Application to Closely-Held Corporations
New California Corporations Code Section 706(a) specifically vali-
dates voting agreements "between two or more shareholders of a close
corporation. ' 75 This raises the problem of the validity of a voting agree-
ment concluded by the shareholders of a closely-held corporation which
has not elected to become a close corporation, or which, because it has
more than ten shareholders, is ineligible for such status. Unfortunately,
no direct evidence exists either in the wording of the statute or in the
Assembly Select Committee Report as to the validity of a voting agree-
ment other than one falling directly within the scope of Section 706(a).
It is arguable that voting agreements among other than close-corpora-
tion shareholders will be subject to traditional common law rules. How-
ever, according to the Assembly Select Committee, Section 706(a) is
based on Section 218(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, the
latter statute being applicable to all shareholder voting agreements. 73 By
taking the substance of the Delaware section, but making it applicable
only to close corporations, the California Legislature may have ex-
pressed an intent to permit no other shareholder voting agreements. But
policy reasons reflected in the case law of the last fifty years militate
against an all-embracing prohibition of shareholder voting agreements.
The previously mentioned judicial fiat against separation of the voting
power of shares from their ownership died a justifiable death. 77 The
idea that shareholders should come to the shareholders' meeting and, on
the basis of full discussion, reach independent decisions is becoming
equally outdated. As stated by one leading writer:
[alithough a few cases have held shareholder pooling agreements
invalid on the ground that parties to such an agreement should not
73. For a collection of cases supporting this view, see W. CARY, CAsEs AD MATE-
PIALS ON COBpORAnONS 376-77 (4th ed. 1969). For an opposing view, see Manne,
Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1427 (1964).
74. Palmbaum v. Magulsky, 217 Mass. 306, 104 N.E. 746 (1914).
75. New CAL. CoRP. CoDE §706(a) (emphasis added).
76. AsSEmmLY EPoRT, supra note 30, at 86.
77. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
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be able to restrict their discretion to cast their votes in the best in-
terests of the corporation, this is a naive and unrealistic concept
of how shareholders behave, particularly in a closely held corpora-
tion. Even if there be some analogy between a meeting of a board
of directors and a meeting of a deliberative governmental body
such as a legislature or legislative committee..., the notion that
a shareholders' meeting is a deliberative body exercising its dispas-
sionate discretion for the corporate good is outdated, to put it
mildly. Hence shareholders should be able to agree in advance
as to how they shall vote their shares. 78
In light of the uncertainty as to the validity of a voting agreement
executed by the shareholders of a corporation which is not a close
corporation, shareholders of a closely-held corporation which is eligible
to become a close corporation clearly should take the appropriate statu-
tory steps to achieve close corporation status if they wish to enter into a
voting agreement that will be valid and enforceable. Shareholders of a
closely-held corporation which is not eligible to become a close corpora-
tion, however, face an as yet unresolved problem. If they desire to enter
into a shareholder voting agreement, the lawyer drafting it would be
well-advised to state in detail the purpose of the agreement and to try to
make all of the shareholders parties thereto. Unanimous shareholder
participation and the existence of a reasonable business purpose may be
determinative if litigation arises as to the validity and enforceability of
the agreement.
C. Shareholder Management Agreements
The discussion in the previous sections was limited to devices which
can be used to control shareholder voting. More often, however, the
major concern of the shareholders of a closely-held corporation is to
control or influence the management process directly. Rather than
leave corporate decision-making to the board of directors, the sharehold-
ers may wish to limit the directors' discretionary authority or transfer
part or perhaps even all of it to themselves. Although the use of
multiple classes of stock may achieve these purposes to some extent the
consequences of becoming ineligible for the close corporation exemptiol
under the California Corporate Securities Law79 and the inability to
elect Subchapter S federal income tax treatment"0 are often sufficiently
adverse to cause incorporators of a small enterprise to search for an
alternative management control device.
78. PAINTR, supra note 2, at 110.
79. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(h).
80. INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, §1371 et seq.
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The so-called shareholders' agreement, hereafter referred to as the
shareholder management agreement, is one device which has often been
used in lieu of a multi-class stock structure. The major and obvious
problem with the shareholder management agreement is that its utiliza-
tion violates the traditional common law concept, now generally ex-
pressed as a statutory norm, that corporate decision-making is a function
of the board of directors."1 Many cases have invalidated these agree-
ments because they interfered with, limited, or effectively abolished
directorial power.8 2 Over the years, however, judicial recognition, or at
least reluctant acceptance, of the closely-held corporation as sui generis
has resulted in limited validation of shareholder management agree-
ments. If agreed to unanimously by the shareholders of a truly closely-
held corporation, or if only limited rather than extensive inroads are
made upon the directors' authority, such agreements have increasingly
been upheld as valid and enforceable.8 Nevertheless, sufficient uncer-
tainty concerning the basic recognition of closely-held corporations as
sui generis, and differences of opinion as to what constitutes a minor
rather than a major limitation upon directorial power, have made it
difficult for the California laywer to assure his clients that a shareholder
management agreement will be enforced by California courts.84
With respect to close corporations, that uncertainty has now been
removed to a large extent by the enactment of Section 300(b) of the
New Code. Provided it is in writing and all of the shareholders of the
close corporation are parties thereto,88
[n]o shareholders' agreement, which relates to any phase of the
affairs of a close corporation ... shall be invalid as between the
parties thereto on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of
the affairs of the corporation as to interfere with the discretion of
the board or that it is an attempt to treat the corporation as if it
were a partnership or to arrange their relationship in a manner that
would be appropriate only between partners.8 6
While the basic validity of shareholder management agreements is
therefore clear,87 the permissible scope of these agreements is in doubt
81. See New CAL. CoRp. CODE §300(a).
82. See 1 'NEAL, supra note 2, Ch. 5 passim.
83. See id.,
84. See CoNmIwo EDUCATION OF THE BAn, ADwvsro CAuFORNL BUSINESS EN-
TERPRiSE 426-30 (1958).
85. New CAL. CORP. CODE §186.
86. New CAL. Corp. CoDE §300(b).
87. It has been suggested that the negative phrasing of the statute creates a new
problem; that is, even though a court cannot invalidate a shareholder management agree-
ment on the grounds specified in the statute, it could invalidate the agreement on another
ground not specified in the statute. See Note, Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close
Corporation in California: Progress and Problems, 27 HAsr. LJ. 433, 448 (1975).
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to some extent. Section 300(b) validates two specific kinds of agree-
ments. First, an agreement which relates to the division of corporate
profits is valid even though the discretionary authority of the board of
directors over corporate dividend policy is thereby limited or abol-
ished.88 Thus, the shareholders may provide in the agreement that
they, rather than the board, will decide whether to declare a dividend;8 9
that dividends shall be declared only if certain specified conditions
exist;90 or that dividends will be distributed in a manner disproportion-
ate to the amount of individual shareholdings. 9' Second, shareholders'
agreements may limit or transfer board authority in relation to the
distribution of corporate assets on dissolution, or provide for specific
ways of distributing such assets.92
In addition, the new statute provides that shareholder agreements
relating to the management of the business shall be valid.0 3 Thus, any
agreed method of structuring the corporate entity for management
purposes, even though it turns the enterprise into an "incorporated
partnership," is valid and enforceable. Space limitations prevent itemi-
zation of the literally dozens of types of provisions from which the
incorporators of a close corporation may choose.94 Suffice it to say that
any management device which changes the traditional corporate deci-
sion-making power allocation would fall into -this category. Thus, to
name only a few possibilities, shareholders may provide that designated
individuals will hold and retain specified corporate positions such as
president, vice president, or secretary-treasurer; create protective mecha-
nisms for the compensation to be paid to such individuals; provide that
specified policy decisions shall require shareholder rather than board
approval; allocate disproportionate decision-making authority over spec-
ified matters to specified individuals; provide that the corporation will
be dissolved upon the happening of specified events; or provide for
dispute-solving methods such as arbitration.
While theoretically correct, such a view ignores practical reality. The reasons previously
given by courts to invalidate shareholder management agreements are all included in the
statute. With the one exception relating to the permissible scope of shareholder man-
agement agreements, validity is established by the statute. See text accompanying notes
88-110 infra.
88. New CAL. Co~a. CODE §300(b).
89. The statutorily required corporate financial condition for the declaration of any
dividend, however, cannot be dispensed with. See CAL. Coni'. CODE §§300(c), 500, 501.
See Comment, California's New General Corporation Law: Dividends and Reacquist-
tions of Shares, this volume at 645.
90. See New CAL. CORP. CoDE- §300(c).
91. See generally 1 0'NEAL, supra note 2, §5.20.
92. New CAL. CORP. CODE §300(b).
93. New CAL. CoRp. CODE §300(b).
94. For a discussion of the various devices and provisions which are often utilized
in the closely-held enterprise, see 1 O'NBEA , supra note 2, Ch. 5 passim; Ghinger, Share-
holders' Agreements for Closely Held Corporations: Special Tools for Special Circum-
stances, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 211 (1975).
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Hence, a close corporation seemingly may emasculate the board of
directors by either severely limiting its traditional discretionary decision-
making power or by transferring that power to the shareholders or
officers. Unlike some other states,9 5 however, California does not
expressly permit the outright abolition of the board of directors. It
remains to be determined, therefore, whether California courts will
permit the indirect abolition of boards of directors by upholding share-
holder management agreements which transfer all decision-making pow-
er to the shareholders and maintain only a sham board.96
It is important to note that specific statutory limitations on the scope
of shareholder management agreements do exist. The New California
Corporations Code expressly provides97 that shareholders' agreements
may not alter or waive the statutory provisions concerning restrictions
upon distributions to shareholders,98 involuntary dissolution proceed-
ings,99 corporate records and reports, °00 rights to inspection of corporate
books and records, 101 crimes and penalties,' required filings with the
Secretary of State, 03 the definition of close corporation status, 04 and
specified voting requirements relating to mergers' 0 5 and reorganiza-
tions.'08 In addition, as with shareholder voting agreements, the share-
holder management agreement is valid for the period specified therein,
or, more importantly, until the corporation loses its close corporation
status, whichever occurs first.'
Increasingly in recent years, courts have deprived the shareholders of
closely-held corporations of the protection of limited personal liability if
they have failed to observe statutorily required formalities in operating
the corporate enterprise. 0 8  To the extent that formalities such as
shareholders' and directors' meetings are dispensed with in accordance
with the terms of a shareholders' management agreement, the New
95. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §351 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.72 (1956);
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 23, §105(a) (1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §701(2)(a)
(1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §14A: 5-21(2) (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 1§1382 (1967);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §7-1.1-51(a) (1970).
96. See Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More
and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145, 1178-80 (1966); Kessler, The New York
Business Corporation Law, 36 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1, 49 (1961). See also 1 O'NEAL,
supra note 2, at §3.60.
97. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §300(c).
98. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §§500, 501; see text accompanying note 89 supra.
99. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §§1800-1809.
100. New CAL. CORP. CODE §§1500-1508.
101. New CAL. CORP. CODE §§1600-1605.
102. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §§2200-2260.
103. New CAL. CORP. CODE §300(c).
104. New CAL. CORP. CODE §158.
105. New CAL. CORP. CODE §1111.
106. New CAL. CORP. CODE §1201(e).
107. New CAL. CORP. CODE §300(b).
108. 1 oNEAL, supra note 2, at §1.09(a).
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California Corporations Code now provides that failure to hold these
meetings "shall not be considered a factor tending to establish that the
shareholders have personal liability for corporate obligations."109 How-
ever, since failure to hold these meetings traditionally has been only one
of many factors relating to piercing a corporation's veil, statutory elimi-
nation of this particular ground for piercing has a somewhat limited
effect on the close corporation shareholder's overall risk of being sub-
jected to personal liability for corporate obligations. Thus, inadequate
capitalization of the enterprise, failure to segregate corporate and per-
sonal funds, use of corporate funds for personal purposes, and failure to
take steps to establish the functional as well as the legal existence of the
corporation, 110 may still cause a close corporation's veil to be pierced.,
Hence, corporate operations should still be planned so as to avoid these
pitfalls.
In planning a close corporation's structure, it must also be recognized
that the transfer of managerial responsibility from the board of directors
to the shareholders in accordance with the provisions of a shareholder
management agreement is accompanied by a statutory transfer of liabili-
ty from the directors to the shareholders for those acts or omissions to
act."12 This provision will undoubtedly be an important factor in the
shareholders' decision as -to the scope of their management agreement,
or whether they wish to execute an agreement at all.
As noted above," 3 agreements between or among shareholders as to
how their shares will be voted are now valid as a matter of general law,
absent fraud, oppression, or the attainment of a personal as opposed to a
group benefit. On the other hand, a shareholder management agree-
ment is in violation of the traditional rule that corporate decision-
making power rests with the board of directors. Therefore, it is to be
expected that these agreements among the shareholders of a closely-
held, as opposed to a close corporation, will not be valid in California
because they will not fall within the scope of the new provisions which
apply only to close corporation shareholder agreements. Hence, if the
participants in a closely-held enterprise wish to achieve a nontraditional
109. New CAL. CoRp. CODB §300(e).
110. The "legal" corporate existence commences when the articles of incorporation
are filed by the Secretary of State. New CAL. Coal. CODB §200(c). Limited personal
liability, however, arises only when the corporation has been established as a properly
functioning entity, i.e- by appointment of duly authorized agents (officers and directors)
to act on its behalf, issuance of shares, opening of corporate books, etc. See Automotriz
Del Golfo De Calif. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957).
111. See Note, Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation in Califor-
nia: Progress and Problems, 27 HAST. L. 433, 469-72 (1975).
112. See New CAL. CORP. CODE §300(d).
113. See text accompanying notes 39-78 supra.
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decision-making structure they will probably be well-advised to attempt
to achieve their objective through utilization of a multi-class stock
structure.
MAINTAINING CONTROL IN CLOSE AND CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS
Once the specific management and control structure has been selected
for a close or closely-held corporation, a new problem must be consid-
ered: protecting that structure against subsequent change. While the
utilization of some of the previously discussed devices incorporates basic
protection against alterations of the status quo, some danger of future
upheaval remains. Other devices are therefore often used, either in
conjunction with or as an alternative to the control mechanisms alluded
to earlier.
A. High Quorum and Voting Requirements
In some cases minority shareholders of a closely-held enterprise may
wish to have veto power over specific matters which are of particular
concern to them. For example, a particular director-shareholder who
will not be a salaried employee of the corporation may not be willing to
invest in the corporation unless he can be given effective assurances that
corporate profits will not be depleted by overly generous salary or bonus
payments to the employee-shareholders. Assuming that he is one of
five directors, it could be provided that a quorum for a board meeting at
which salaries are considered shall consist of all five directors, and that
the affirmative vote of all five directors shall be required for passage of
an employee salary resolution. Similarly, a shareholders owning twenty
percent of the corporation's voting shares could be given a veto power
by providing that, as to a specified corporate matter such as a proposed
merger, the necessary quorum at the shareholders' meeting shall be
81 percent of the outstanding shares and that the affirmative vote of at
least 81 percent of the outstanding shares shall be required for share-
holder approval. Requirements for these "super-majority" or "veto"
provisions can be established in both closely-held and close corporations
in California under the New Code. However, while such a provision
may be contained either in the articles of incorporation or in a share-
holder management agreement in the case of a close corporation,' 14 a
closely-held corporation must include it in the articles of incorpora-
tion."15
114. New CAL. CoRP. CODE §204(a).
115. See New CAL. Comp. CODE §204(a).
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High quorum and vote requirements can serve a useful purpose.116
They can also become a tool of virtual extortion in the hands of an
unscrupulous minority shareholder or board member and, if the require-
ments have been made applicable to too many corporate matters, corpo-
rate paralysis may result. For these reasons, they should be used with
the utmost care and only after other alternatives are considered.
B. Preemptive Rights
One of the primary concerns of shareholders in a closely-held enter-
prise quite often is maintenance of the proportionate voting rights as
they existed at the time the enterprise was formed. The issuance of
additional shares, however, can drastically alter the corporate voting
structure. Since additional shares may be authorized by the affirmative
vote of a majority of all outstanding shares entitled to vote,11 7 minority
shareholders who individually or collectively hold less than fifty percent
of the corporation's outstanding voting shares could have their propor-
tionate voting control reduced by majority authorization to issue newly
created shares.
There are -two methods available to protect minority shareholders
against this potential dilution of their voting power. The first is to
provide that the issuance of new shares shall require the affirmative vote
of a specified "super majority" of the corporation's outstanding voting
shares. Thus, a 20 percent shareholder can be protected by requir-
ing the affirmative vote of 81 percent of the outstanding voting
shares. Pursuant to the New Code, in the case of a closely-held
corporation, this type of provision must be contained in the articles of
incorporation to 'be valid."" In -the case of a close corporation, the
provision may be inserted either in the articles of incorporation or in a
shareholder's management agreement."" If a "super-majority" provi-
sion is included in the articles of incorporation, however, care must be
taken to provide that the same "super-majority" is also required to
amend such a vote requirement since otherwise a simple majority of the
outstanding voting shares could delete the "super-majority" requirement
from the articles of incorporation in the future.
The second method is provision for preemptive rights in the share-
holders. Unlike most other states, California does not confer preemp-
tive rights unless they are expressly provided for.1 20 In fact, an express
116. See PNTER, supra note 2, at 127-31; 1 O'NEAL, supra note 2, Ch. 4.
117. See New CAL,. CoRP. CODE §§152, 902(a).
118. See New CAL. CoRP. CODB §204(a)(5).
119. See New CAL. CORP. CODE §§186, 204(a).
120. See New CAL. CoRP. CODE §204(a)(2).
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grant of preemptive rights must be contained in the articles of incorpo-
ration in the case of a closely-held corporation.12' On the other hand,
they may be inserted in either the articles of incorporation or in a
shareholders' management agreement in the case of a close corpora-
tion.12Z
The traditional common law preemptive rights doctrine is of limited
scope, granting to each shareholder the right -to purchase a portion of
newly authorized shares which are being issued for cash, proportionate
to his present shareholdings.2 3 The doctrine does not apply to newly
authorized shares to be issued by the corporation in return for property
or services other than cash;124 to effect a corporate merger; 2 5 or in
payment of a corporate debt. 26 In addition, the doctrine does not
apply to previously authorized but unissued shares, 27 or to previously
issued shares reacquired by the corporation. 2 s Although some courts
have granted preemptive rights with regard to previously authorized but
unissued shares and to treasury shares under exceptional circum-
stances,129 reliance on these exceptions is primarily an invitation to
litigation.
In drafting a preemptive rights provision the attorney must be cogni-
zant of these potential problems. The use of traditional "boiler-plate'
language to the effect that "shareholders shall have full preemptive
rights as defined by law" in many instances may create unnecessary
difficulties which could easily have been avoided with more precise
draftsmanship. Thought should therefore be given at the time of incor-
poration to the question of whether preemptive rights ought to be
conferred in certain situations by an express provision. For example,
applying preemptive rights to mergers or to corporate acquisitions of
property may hamper the corporation's ability to consummate such
transactions, and on the balance -this may be too high a price to pay to
maintain the shareholder's proportionate voting power. On -the other
hand, if a corporation is organized with an authorization to issue more
121. See New CAL. Coap. CODE §204(a).
122. See New CAL. CORP. CODE §§186, 204(a).
123. See Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906); N.
LATr, THE LAw OF CopoRmO ONS 493-94 (2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter cited as LAT-
TIN).
124. For a collection of cases, see W. CARY, CAsES AND MTmuALs oN CORPoRA-
TiONS 1143-44, (4th ed. 1969).
125. See Musson v. New York & Queens Elect. Lt. & Pow. Co., 138 Misc. 881, 247
N.Y.S. 406 (1931).
126. See Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., Inc., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E.
917 (1930).
127. See LkrrIN, supra note 123, at 494.
128. See Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1925).
129. See IATrin, supra note 123, at 495-96.
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shares than in fact will be issued initially, and if the purpose is to have
unissued shares that may subsequently be used to raise additional capi-
tal, it would seem most desirable to expressly provide that shareholders
have preemptive rights in these shares. In addition, due to the frequent
use of first-option transfer restrictions in the closely-held and close
corporation, there is a high likelihood that the corporation will reacquire
some of its own shares. Unless a provision exists for the mandatory
retirement of reacquired shares, an express grant of preemptive rights
should be considered in the event they are reissued.
C. Stock Transfer Restrictions
The success of a small business depends partly upon the existence of
harmonious relationships among its participants, which are best ensured
when there is substantial agreement as to the goals and operational
methods of the enterprise. It is therefore not surprising that the share-
holders of a close or closely-held corporation generally wish to control
who becomes part of the enterprise. One aspect of traditional Ameri-
can corporation law presents an obstacle to the attainment of this
shareholder desire. The alienability of corporate shares, based upon
their legal characterization as personal property, 30 gives to each share-
holder the power to transfer his shares to anyone willing to pay the
purchase price. While this alienability is an absolute necessity from an
investment viewpoint with regard to the publicly-held corporation, it is a
serious problem for the close and closely-held corporation. Hence, the
increasing use of the corporate form by small enterprises has been
accompanied by the development of control devices designed to limit the
ability of shareholders to transfer their shares.
The New California Corporations Code provides that the articles of
incorporation' 31 or the bylaws1e 3 2 may contain reasonable restrictions
upon the right to transfer corporate shares. Arguably, a transfer restric-
tion may also be inserted in a shareholder management agreement in the
case of a close corporation. 18 3 There is no statutory definition, how-
ever, of what constitutes a reasonable share transfer restriction. Conse-
quently, a brief survey of the judicial treatment of various transfer
restrictions is needed to establish the probable parameters of this statuto-
130. For the view that regarding stock transfer restrictions as restraints on aliena-
tion, and therefore undesirable or prohibited, is an unrealistic, unwise, and unnecessarily
analytical approach, see PAnrrER, supra note 2, at 84-85.
131. New CAL. Cornp. CoDE §204(b).
132. New CAL. CoRp. CODE §212(b).
133. See Note, Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation in Califor-
nia: Progress and Problems, 27 HAsT. L.. 433, 458-63 (1975).
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rily permissible device.134
1. Absolute Transfer Prohibition
Absolute prohibitions on the transfer of shares have generally been
held invalid. 13 5 In a few cases, however, absolute transfer prohibitions
imposed for a specifically limited time period of short duration have
been upheld.136
Unfortunately, no California cases dealing with this issue have been
found. However, two older New York decisions have validated absolute
transfer restrictions in the closely-held corporation setting. In one
case,137 the court upheld a restriction upon shares of stock which were
transferred by the corporation to -two inventors of a machine in ex-
change for their invention. That restriction provided that the stock was
to be held jointly and was inalienable for ten years unless both share-
holders consented -to a transfer. In the other case,1 18 the court upheld
an agreement whereby the promoters of a corporation placed a specified
number of stock certificates in trust for six months, the stock remaining
in trust unless all the promoters consented in writing to withdraw the
shares. It is important that in both cases the court noted that the
purpose of the transfer restriction was to place the shareholders on an
equal footing as to control and that the agreement was made for the
benefit of all parties. Thus, it would be highly advisable for the
draftsman of an absolute transfer restriction -to identify the purpose
behind the imposition of the restriction, thereby providing a court with a
concrete reason for upholding such a device.
2. Consent Restrictions
Provisions which permit a shareholder -to transfer his shares only with
the consent of the corporation or of the other shareholders traditionally
have been disfavored by American courts.' 39 However, recent cases
seem to uphold these restrictions if they serve a reasonable business need
which is identified in the restriction and if protection is given against
arbitrary or unreasonable withholding of consent.140  Therefore, a care-
fully drafted consent-to-transfer provision may be upheld, especially if
accompanied by a first-option provision, which is discussed below.
134. For detailed treatment, see 2 O'NEAL, supra note 2, Ch. 7; Bradley, Stock
Transfer Restrictions and Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. LF. 139 (1969).
135. For a collection of cases, see 2 O'NFAL, supra note 2, at §7.06 n.2.
136. Homstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 435, 446-47 (1953).
137. Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun. 230, 36 N.Y.S. 627 (1895).
138. Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N.Y. 519, 43 N.E. 57 (1896).
139. See PAnrrrnn, supra note 2, at 86.
140. See 2 O'NE A, supra note 2, at §7.08 no.3, 5 and 6.
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3. First-Option Provisions
The share transfer restriction most often employed, generally upheld
as reasonable by the courts, and normally sufficient to achieve the
desired corporate goal, is the so-called "first-option" device. It provides
that a shareholder who wishes to sell his shares must first offer them to
the corporation or to the other shareholders; the shareholder may sell
them to an outsider only in the case where the designated optionee
decides not to buy the shares. In order to be upheld, this type of
provision must limit the option time to a reasonable period.141 In
addition, it must be drafted carefully so as to encompass all potential
transfers of shares, inter vivos and testamentary, as well as transfers by
operation of law.'42 To avoid future disputes over the purchase price,
the restriction should specify either a purchase price or a method or
formula to determine that price.143
4. Buy-Out Agreements
Another provision which may be utilized obligates the corporation or
its shareholders to buy the shares upon the happening of a specified
event, usually a shareholder's retirement or death."' This type of
provision is of particular utility where the shareholders are all active
participants in the operation of the corporation. If used properly, either
singly or somtimes in combination, all of the aforementioned devices
can give substantial control over the transfer of shares and thus over the
membership of a closely-held enterprise. It must be stressed that a
myriad of problems which are beyond the scope of this article, such as
the assurance of funding and possible tax consequences, must be care-
fully considered by the attorney when drafting transfer restriction provi-
sions.
5. Qualification of Shareholders
The New California Corporations Code also provides that the articles
of incorporation may impose special qualifications on the ability to
become a shareholder. 45  In the case of a close corporation, such a
qualification provision may be included in the articles of incorporation
or in a shareholder management agreement.' 46 It would thus be possi-
ble to limit the transferability of shares by providing that only persons
141. Id. at §7.19.
142. See PNmR, supra note 2, at 92.
143. Id. at 93-98. See 10 CAL. ADmN. CoDE §260.140.8.
144. See O'NEAL, supra note 2, §7.10.
145. New CAL. CoRn. Cona §204(a)(3).
146. New CAL. CoRr. CoDm N204(a).
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having specified educational or business backgrounds, or professional
or vocational expertise, may become corporate shareholders. There-
fore, this device may be indispensable to a corporation conducting a
specialized or unique type of business operation.
CONCLUSION
Statutory recognition in California of the close corporation as a form
of business association distinguishable from the publicly-held corpora-
tion is a realistic law reform. Undoubtedly many small business enter-
prises will avail themselves of this alternate form of business association.
The major benefit of close corporation status unquestionably is the
ability to adopt shareholder management agreements and thereby design
a control and operational structure meeting the needs of the particular
enterprise and its participants.
The statutory validation of such devices as shareholder voting and
management agreements also allows California attorneys to feel more
secure that these intra-corporate arrangements will be safe from attack.
At the same time, the close corporation statutory provisions undoubtedly
will result in increased litigation in some areas. The permissible scope
of shareholder management agreements is unclear under the statute; that
limit will surely be sought through litigation. The proper role and
permissible activities of closely-held corporations, falling between the
close and the publicly-held corporation, surely will also have to be
determined. However, it is undeniable that much of the uncertainty
that existed before enactment of the New Corporations Code has been
removed by the California Legislature.
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Appendix. Skeleton Articles of Incorporation




The name of this corporation is
I.
This is a close corporation.
in.
The issued shares of this corporation shall be held of record by
no more than - persons.
IV.
The purpose of this corporation is to engage in any lawful act
or activity for which a corporation may 'be organized under the
General Corporation Law of California other than the banking
business, the trust company 'business, or the practice of a profes-
sion permitted to be incorporated -by the California Corporations
Code
V.
The corporation's agent for service of process is
whose address is , California.
VI.
The corporation is authorized to issue shares, all of
one class.
VII.
The persons appointed to act as initial directors of this corpora-
tion are:
Name Address
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the persons
hereinabove named as the initial directors of this corporation,
have executed these Articles of Incorporation this - day of
, 19__.
